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Abstract
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide veriﬁable policy-relevant in-
formation to a political decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. We show that
both lobbying instruments are interdependent. In our view information provision is a risky
attempt to aﬀect the politician’s beliefs about the desirability of the lobby’s objective. The
constraints governing informational lobbying determine a speciﬁc lottery available. The cir-
cumstances under which political pressure can be applied specify the lobby’s valuation of
diﬀerent beliefs of the politician and, thus, her attitude toward risk. The combination of lot-
teries available and the ‘shadow of political pressure’ (or induced risk preference) determines
the optimal lobbying behavior.
We identify several factors that induce risk proclivity (and thus information provision), which
allows to explain the stylized fact that lobbies engage both in information provision and po-
litical pressure. Moreover, our approach gives a novel explanation for the fact that interest
groups often try to provide information credibly. We ﬁnally study the extent to which this
preference for credibility is robust and identify some instances in which lobbies may prefer
to strategically withhold information.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the United States the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has an elaborate clinical trial
process that requires speciﬁc information from pharmaceutical companies when examining new
drugs for distribution to the public.1 In a joint editorial published in September 2004, The
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) stated that greater openness is
needed to prevent clinical trials information from being selectively reported.2 However, infor-
mation is not always hold back. An example is a study sponsored by Bristol-Myers Squibb and
carried out at Harvard University’s medical complex. The study compared the performance
of two prescription drugs and concluded, contrary to Bristol Myers Squibb’s interest, that the
sponsor’s drug was not as eﬀective as the competitor’s.3 In addition to the strategic provision
of information, drug companies are believed to have other means to inﬂuence the FDA approval
process. For instance, two strategies are reported to be now widely adopted: “(1) Firms them-
selves have in the past six to eight years created, fostered, and subsidized a number of patient
advocacy groups; and (2) ﬁrms regularly seek alliances with patient advocates in pressing the
case for priority status, accelerated approval, or simply approval before the FDA”.4
Casual observations like the preceding raise questions. When is veriﬁable information volun-
tarily provided? Suppose there is an institutional arrangement that allows information providers
to commit not to hold back information once they have learned evidence that harms their cause.
What are the incentives to use such a commitment device? Is there a relationship between the
incentives to provide information voluntarily and the incentives to use these commitment de-
vices? How does the availability of other means of inﬂuence aﬀect the incentives for information
provision? More broadly, why do lobbies usually engage in both informational lobbying and
other means of inﬂuence, say, campaign contributions?
To provide some answers to these questions we model a political decision-maker who has
to take a single policy decision and is lobbied by an interest group.5 The politician is both
responsive to political pressure and wants to make ‘good’ decisions.6 In her decision she trades
1 It demands pre-clinical testing and approves the clinical trial protocols. The FDA can refuse to ﬁle an
application that is incomplete because, for example, some required studies are missing. See e.g. Meadows (2002).
2 The 11 journals – which include prestigious institutions such as the New England Journal of Medicine –
agreed oﬃcially not to publish studies in their respective journals which contain references to clinical trials that
have not been registered publicly, see ICMJE (2004).
3 See Cannon et al (2004).
4 See Carpenter (2004), p. 56.
5 Throughout this paper we use the words “political decision-maker”, “politician” and “legislator”, on one
hand and on the other “interest group”, “group” and “lobby” interchangeably. Also, we employ the words “to
lobby” and “to inﬂuence” when referring to both activities of a lobby.
6 We employ an abstract notion of political pressure intended to capture campaign contributions, bribes, issue
adds, endorsement of candidates or propaganda campaigns like May Day marches. Propaganda campaigns make
the electorate more sensitive to the issues that matter for the lobby. An example is the eﬀort of the association
of chemists in Germany or Spain to maintain a situation in which (even nonprescription) drugs can only be sold









oﬀ ‘acting optimally given her beliefs about the suitability of each policy’ against the pressure
of the lobby. The more ‘convinced’ she is that the group’s objective is a ‘good’ policy, the easier
for the lobby to inﬂuence her through pressure. Before deciding on political pressure the lobby
can invest in costly policy relevant information with the hope to aﬀect the politician’s beliefs
in such a way that she is more likely to decide in favor of the group. However, informational
lobbying may be unsuccessful and as a result the politician is more convinced not to support
the lobby’s cause. This structure implies that informational lobbying has a strategic eﬀect on
the pressure game. If informational lobbying is successful, this eﬀect is positive. If it is not, the
eﬀect is negative.
The main point to take away from the present paper is that there is an important strategic
interaction between both lobbying instruments. Information provision is a risky attempt to aﬀect
the politician’s beliefs about the desirability of the lobby’s objective. The constraints governing
informational lobbying determine a speciﬁc lottery available. The circumstances under which
political pressure can be applied deﬁne the manner in which the lobby’s payoﬀs in the pressure
game respond to diﬀerent beliefs of the politician. This speciﬁes the lobby’s valuation of diﬀerent
beliefs of the politician and, thus, her attitude toward risk. The combination of lotteries available
and induced risk preference determines the optimal lobbying behavior.
The ﬁrst part of this paper analyzes the importance of the induced risk preference for in-
formational lobbying in an abstract continuation game. The continuation games considered
embody diﬀerent reasonable — but benchmark — responses to beliefs of the politician. An ad-
vantage of our focus on these responses is to allow the derivation of results that do not depend
on the politician’s prior belief. So, Section 2 outlines a model of informational lobbying without
specifying the continuation game in detail. Following Milgrom (1981), we analyze informational
lobbying in terms of veriﬁable reports rather than the alternative ‘cheap talk’ framework of
Crawford and Sobel (1982).7 This permits us, on one hand, to argue that the constraints of
informational lobbying determine a speciﬁc lottery available.
On the other, it enables us to address in Section 3 the issue of credibility of informational
lobbying that the descriptive literature on lobbying has identiﬁed to be an important concern
of lobbies. We specify two simple benchmark information transmission technologies that can be
interpreted as commissioning external experts (we call this a public test) or a lobby doing the
research on his own (we call this a private test). We argue that both technologies resolve the
trade-oﬀ between credibility and scope for manipulation diﬀerently. While the external expert
is perfectly credible because he always reveals what he has learned, a lobby doing research by
himself can hold back information.8
In our model credible information provision is a natural lobbying behavior because the in-
7 Apart from the example of drug approval Wright (1996, p. 112) lends support to our modelling choice: “The
ability of legislators to at least occasionally verify lobbying information is a crucial part of the lobbying process”.
8 Schlozman and Tierney (1986, p. 103) report that a “reputation for being credible and trustworthy is
especially critical for those organizations whose representatives have direct contact with government oﬃcials”.
Berry (1997, p. 98) summarizes “credibility comes ﬁrst”. Wright (1996, p. 3) reports that lobbies frequently use








centives to provide information voluntarily are linked to a preference to commit not to hold
back information in order to increase the lobby’s credibility. The link we provide is that both a
commitment not to hold back information and providing information per se are risky activities.
Hence, both choices depend in the same way on the lobby’s disposition to accept risk. When
should we then expect risk proclivity (and thus information provision)?
In order to answer this question we specify in Section 4 two speciﬁc pressure games. Although
the details of the optimal lobbying behavior are sensible to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, our
analysis yields some key ﬁndings:
1. As predicted in Section 3, if informational lobbying takes place, the lobby prefers to do so
credibly.
2. If applying pressure is straightforward, then the lobby is risk averse and both instruments
are not employed together. Informational lobbying is only an option if political pressure
is too expensive or it faces some risk of being ineﬀective.
3. For given costs of pressure, that is, a given attitude toward risk, lobbying behavior depends
also on the characteristics of the information game, that is, the speciﬁc lottery available.
We then study if there are instances in which the lobby does not prefer to be credible and,
hence, optimally chooses to withhold information. We identify two factors that may cause such a
preference reversal: (i) Disclosing information weakening the lobby’s position may be irreversible
(in the sense that this disclosure cannot be compensated by an increased amount of pressure).
(ii) The amount of pressure the lobby needs to exert may depend more on the bargaining power
of the lobby vs. the politician than on the information disclosed. In both cases, a lobby may
ﬁnd it optimal to withhold information, even if it harms the lobby’s credibility.
Despite the fact that there is a literature analyzing how lobbies inﬂuence political decisions
by, on one hand, political pressure and, on the other hand, providing policy-relevant information,
little is known about the interaction of both lobbying instruments.9 Previous to us – but in
independent work – Bennedsen and Feldmann (2005) analyze a closely related model. Although
some important diﬀerences in the modelling details, their investigation is close in spirit because
lobbies can aﬀect a political decision by the exertion of political pressure or informational lob-
bying. They ﬁnd that the information provision activity is, in many instances, non-optimal for
the lobby due to the negative strategic eﬀect it generates. Consequently, their model cannot
explain the stylized fact that lobbies engage both in informational lobbying and exert political
pressure. They assume what we call a private test and, therefore, they cannot analyze the issue
of credible information provision. Instead, Bennedsen and Feldmann investigate other issues like
the multiple lobby case and rational expectations equilibria. Another paper concerned with the
interaction of information and pressure is Dahm and Porteiro (2005) which builds on the results
derived in the present paper and explores policy implications for campaign ﬁnance reform.









We are not aware of other works in which political pressure and informational lobbying
interact as in the present paper.10 In Austen-Smith (1995 and 1998) and Lohmann (1995a)
contributions are necessary in order to gain access to a political decision-maker. Without access
the lobby cannot transmit information and can therefore not advance his issues. Such a setting is
diﬀerent from our approach in which political pressure may directly induce the lobby’s preferred
outcome. We provide therefore a diﬀerent explanation why both lobbying instruments might be
used together. The work of Yu (2005) is related, because it analyzes the choice of interest groups
between diﬀerent lobbying instruments (lobbying the government or persuading the public).
2A S i m p l e M o d e l o f V e r i ﬁable Informational Lobbying
There are two states of the world a and b. The true state of the world ω is unknown, but it is
common knowledge that the probability of state a is q0 < 1. A political decision-maker DM has
to decide between two policies A and B, the idea being that policy A is correct in state a and
B in the other. On one hand, the politician wants to make ‘good’ decisions and is more inclined
to choose A the higher her prior belief q0. On the other, she is responsive to political pressure
of a lobby preferring policy B independent of the state ω.
Consider a sequential game with the following decision stages:
1. L may engage in informational lobbying summarized in a variable x.
2. Taking into account informational lobbying, DM updates rationally her beliefs over the
likelihood of each state of the world to qx.
3. L decides how much pressure to exert given qx.
4. DM decides over the policy, given qx and the political pressure of L.
This game can be solved by backwards induction: given the result of informational lobbying,
that is, a posterior belief qx of the politician, the group acts optimally in the pressure game.
Ah i g h e rqx corresponds to a lower payoﬀ in the pressure game because the politician is more
convinced that the lobby’s aim is the ‘wrong’ policy and more pressure is needed. In Section 3 we
focus on a continuous, decreasing and twice diﬀerentiable payoﬀ function EΠL(q) representing
the later decision stages. We relate the shape of this function to the incentives for informational
provision.11 We describe now a simple model of informational lobbying.
10 For instance Sloof and van Winden (2000) analyze the decision of a lobby between persuasion through the
use of ‘words’ or ‘actions’ in a repeated signaling game. The driving force is the reputation of the lobby that
determines if a threat is enough to persuade or must be carried out. Therefore, its focus lies in what we consider
to be ‘political pressure’. Lohmann (1995b) develops a signaling model of competitive political pressures as
collective actions. In her model pressure plays a purely informational role because it helps a decision-maker to
extract information about the state of the world.
11 In Section 4 we assume more structure on the pressure game. However, as we will see shortly, apart from








The interest group may acquire costly policy-relevant information and decide whether to
transmit it. When the agenda is announced, L is supposed to have no more information than
DM. The lobby chooses between the following two instruments of informational lobbying.
Private test [PR]: At a cost C(x) the lobby can buy a test which reveals with probability
x ∈ [0,1] t h et r u es t a t eo ft h ew o r l d ,t h a ti s ,t = ω. With probability 1 − x the test is not
successful, no information is obtained and t = ∅. The result of the test is hard evidence and
the investment in information x is observed by the politician. Once the test is carried out the
interest group decides on what kind of message M to send to DM. The lobby may hold back
information but cannot lie and convince the politician. Thus, if t = ω,t h e nM ∈ {ω,∅} and if
t = ∅,t h e nM = ∅. The underlying idea of a private test is that the interest group can carry
out some research and then decide strategically how to use this information. If the state is a,
the lobby does not need to reveal this information. This strategic scope limits the credibility of
the message that the test failed.12
Public test [PU]: At the same cost C(x), the lobby can buy another test which has exactly
t h es a m ep r o p e r t i e sa sap r i v a t et e s t .I td i ﬀers only in the set of admissible messages. Under
a public test the test result is always revealed (M = t). A public test captures the idea of an
external expert paid by the lobby who always reveals all that he knows. Once the test is carried
out, there is no strategic scope but the message that the test has failed is credible. On the other
hand, if the state is a,t h i sw i l lb er e v e a l e d . 13
3 How the Attitude Toward Risk Aﬀects Informational Lobby-
ing
3.1 Credibility versus Scope for Manipulation
In this subsection we analyze the determinants of the test choice of the lobby. We focus on any
level x ∈ (0,1) of informational lobbying and provide a ‘dominance-type of result’ concerning
the optimal test choice. Since both tests are assumed to cause the same costs, in this section
the cost function C(x) plays no role. Also, the level x considered may be the lobby’s optimal
choice or a level induced by some type of formal or informal constraint.14
our results also apply. It is intuitive that the lobby prefers the decision sequence outlined to both a simultaneous
decision and the sequence pressure-information. The reason is that it allows the group to adjust the pressure
activity to the outcome of the informational lobbying stage.
12 Wright (1996) reports (on page 4) that even “...today the prevailing assumption among interest group
scholars is that lobbyists may shade the truth from time to time, but they do not deliberately distort it for
their own advantage”. Modelling the strategic discretion of an economic agent by what we call a private test is
widely used, see Laﬀont (1999). It was introduced in the literature on informational lobbying by Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2002 and 2005). See also Aghion and Tirole (1997) and specially Chapter 11 in Laﬀont and Tirole
(1993).
13This idea that the agents may decide to make public information that, a priori, is damaging for them can
also be found in other ﬁelds such as models of patent races (see, for instance, Baker and Mezzetti (2005)).
14 The FDA regulations mentioned provide one example for compulsory information provision. Another example








Table 1: Eﬀect of Informational Lobbying on the Politician’s Belief
test result t = b t = a t = ∅
probability of t x(1 − q0) xq0 1 − x
qx with public test 0 1 q0
qx with private test 0 q(x) q(x)
From the outset it is not clear which test is more advantageous for the group. With prob-
ability x(1 − q0) informational lobbying has a positive eﬀect (t = b) and both tests induce the
same posterior qx =0 . However, with the remaining probability the negative eﬀect occurs and
diﬀers under both tests.
With a public test the politician updates with probability xq0 to qx =1(because t = a)
a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − x to qx = q0 (when t = ∅). When the private test is successful and
the state is not the ideal one for the interest group (t = a), the lobby prefers to hold back
this information, because the lobby can do better than revealing the true state by sending the
message that the test has failed (M = ∅). Therefore, when receiving this message the politician
k n o w st h a ti ti sm o r el i k e l yt h a nq0 t h a tt h et r u es t a t ei sa. Bayes’ rule gives the posterior
qx = q(x) ≡
q0
1−x(1−q0) ≥ q0.15 Therefore, the negative strategic eﬀect of a private test leads to
an intermediate value q(x) ∈ [q0,1]. Table 1 gives a summary.
Ex-ante informational lobbying, the total expected proﬁts of the lobby under both tests,
private (PR) and public (PU), are given by
EΠPR
L (x)=x(1 − q0)EΠL (qx =0 ) +( 1− x(1 − q0))EΠL (qx = q(x)) − C(x), (1)
EΠPU
L (x)=x(1 − q0)EΠL(qx =0 ) +xq0EΠL(qx =1 )+( 1− x)EΠL(qx = q0) − C(x). (2)
Comparison of these expressions yields the intuitive insight that the lobby prefers the in-
formation technology that causes the less harmful negative eﬀect. The next proposition links
the test choice to the properties of the continuation game.16 All proofs are relegated to an
Appendix.
player in Washington politics’ (see Wright (1996, p. 76). The literature often assumes that informational lobbying
is either done or not and if it is done it reveals the true state with some ﬁxed probability. This is equivalent to
buying a ﬁxed amount of information or not.
15 Note that the higher the quality of the test, the higher the probability the politician assigns to state a after




[1−x(1−q0)]2 > 0.M o r e o v e r ,q(x =0 )=q0 and
q(x =1 )=1 .
16 As mentioned before Wright (1996) reports that lobbies frequently use external experts and that they also









Proposition 1 For all x ∈ (0,1) and for all q0
(i) the private test is strictly preferred, if EΠL(q) is strictly concave;
(ii) the public test is strictly preferred, if EΠL(q) is strictly convex and
(iii) the lobby is indiﬀerent between the tests, if EΠL(q) is linear.
To gain an intuition for the role the curvature of the proﬁt function plays for the test choice,
we draw an analogy to the basic theory of choice under uncertainty. In this analogy the function
EΠL(q) takes on the role of the Bernoulli utility function and qx the one of income. Note
that each test deﬁnes a lottery. Since both lotteries yield with probability x(1 − q0) ap a y o ﬀ
of EΠL (qx =0 ) , the lobby’s preference is determined only by the comparison of the remaining
events.
Under a public test [PU] qx can be thought of as a random variable which can take on two
values, {q0,1}. The probability of the ﬁrst value is 1−x
1−x(1−q0) while the one of the second is
xq0
1−x(1−q0). Consequently, the expected outcome is 1−x
1−x(1−q0)q0+
xq0
1−x(1−q0) = q(x) which is shown
in Figure 1 on the horizontal axis as the convex combination of q0 and 1. The public test for
a given level of information x is then represented by the chord connecting (q0,EΠL(q0)) and
(1,EΠL(1)) with expected utility EΠL(PU)= 1−x
1−x(1−q0)EΠL(qx = q0)+
xq0
1−x(1−q0)EΠL(qx =1 ) .
The private test [PR] can be thought of as the degenerate lottery that pays q(x) with
certainty, that is, EΠL(PR)=EΠL(q(x)). Concavity of EΠL(q) implies that EΠL(PR) >
EΠL(PU) and, therefore, induces the lobby to behave as risk averse and to prefer the private
test.17
Fig. 1: An Example of Risk Aversion Fig. 2: An Example of Risk Proclivity
Although the case depicted in Figure 2 does not ﬁt exactly into the categories of Proposition
1, the main intuition can be applied. The public test is represented by the chord connecting
(q0,EΠL(q0)) and (1,EΠL(1)).W eh a v et h a tEΠL(PR) <E ΠL(PU). For the relevant values
of q0 and q(x), the lobby exhibits risk proclivity, even though EΠL(q) is strictly concave for some
q.18 We present now examples in order to show that the benchmark cases of Proposition 1 may
17 We could also deﬁne a certainty-equivalent allocation qc which the lobby considers to be equally advantageous
as the public test. Of course, because the lobby prefers a lower q,w eh a v eq(x) <q c.









Example 1 [Disclosures and asset returns ` a la Shin (2003)].
A ﬁrm undertakes a project which succeeds with probability 1−q0 and fails with probability q0.I f
the project is a success the liquidation value of the ﬁrm is u and d otherwise, where 0 <d<u .
The manager is interested in maximizing the price of the ﬁrm. The market ﬁxes the price based
on all available evidence. Before the project is terminated and its result is publicly observed
there is an interim stage in which the manager has observed with probability x the success of the
project. At this date the manager decides on a disclosure policy in order to maximize the interim
value of the ﬁrm. In this example EΠL(q)=qd+( 1− q)u. Since this is a linear function, the
manager acts as risk neutral and is indiﬀerent between both tests.
Example 2 [Pork barrel projects ` a la Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002)].
There is a legislature composed of three districts (indexed by i) that decides on the aggregate level
G of a public good and to what extent gi each district i beneﬁts from it (Σ3
i=1gi = G). Due to equal
sharing of provision costs among the three districts, each legislator maximizes ui = rigi − 1
6G2,
where the marginal valuations ri ∈ {0,1} diﬀer across districts. The uncorrelated ri’s are equal
to one with probability 1 − q0. Legislators form a policy coalition in order to pass by majority
voting a bill proposed by a randomly chosen agenda setter.
An interest group can promote the provision of the public good through informational lobbying.
Before the agenda setter is determined the group must search in exactly one (randomly deter-
mined) district. The level of informational lobbying x ∈ (0,1) is ﬁxed. After receiving the lobby’s
message the agenda setter chooses the allocation of the public good so as to maximize his own
(expected) payoﬀ, subject to receiving the support of one other legislator. The legislator outside
the policy coalition does not receive beneﬁts from the public good but contributes to its cost.
Incentives for informational lobbying are given by the total amount of the public good provided
EΠL(q)=G∗(q)= 3
1
1−q+B otherwise, where B is a positive constant. Since this is a strictly
concave function, risk aversion is induced and the lobby prefers strictly the private test.20
I nS e c t i o n4w ep r e s e n tal o b b y i n gm o d e li nw h i c hEΠL(q) is strictly convex. Another
instance in which EΠL(q) is strictly convex is given by Example 2 when the lobby is an envi-
adding the qualiﬁcation “for the relevant values of q0 and q(x)”. In Subsection 4.2 we provide a micro-foundation
for Figure 2.
19 The examples are simpliﬁed instances in which the literature uses a private test. A second purpose we pursue
by choosing these examples is to show that Proposition 1 is meaningful in a much wider class of situations than
the ones involving a continuation game in which political pressure is available.
20 To be fully precise, this example is not a special case of Proposition 1, because the objective functions at
the informational lobbying stage are slightly diﬀerent from equations (1) and (2). The reason is that the negative
strategic eﬀect of informational lobbying is mitigated by excluding the searched district from the policy coalition
(when it does not coincide with the agenda setter). Since this possibility does not depend on the type of the test,
it is straightforward to take this into account. Further details are available upon request (and for the convenience








ronmental group that is interested in minimizing the total amount of the public good, say local
highway constructions.21
3.2 Voluntary Information Provision
In this subsection we analyze when the lobby voluntarily engages in informational lobbying. As
in the last subsection we work with EΠL(q). For clarity of the exposition we suppose also that
t h ec o s tf u n c t i o nC (x) is increasing, strictly convex, twice diﬀerentiable, and subject to the
usual boundary condition that C0 (0) = 0.22
Proposition 2 Under both tests and for all q0 the following is true
(i) there is informational lobbying, if EΠL(q) is strictly convex and
(ii) there is no informational lobbying, if EΠL(q) is concave.
Again, we gain an intuition from an analogy to the basic theory of choice under uncertainty.
Informational lobbying can be thought of as a lottery between two values, while not engaging
in informational lobbying yields a certain amount with certainty. A lobby only engages in
information provision if the continuation game induces risk proclivity. If risk aversion is induced,
no information is provided — even if information is costless for the group.23
Propositions 1 and 2 link the incentives for engagement in informational lobbying to those
for a commitment to provide credible information, because both depend in the same way on the
lobby’s attitude toward risk.
Corollary 1 Suppose information is voluntarily provided. Then for all q0
(i) there is informational lobbying and the public test is strictly preferred, if EΠL(q) is strictly
convex;
(ii) there is no informational lobbying (and no negative strategic eﬀect) so that the lobby is
trivially indiﬀerent among the tests, if EΠL(q) is concave.
Although the situations considered in the next section are not always a special case of this
Corollary, it provides strong intuitions for the results because the same forces are at play.
21Interestingly, this implies that the incentives for informational lobbying may depend on which side of an issue
al o b b yi so n .
22 If EΠL(q) is concave but not a straight line, Proposition 2 (ii) is true even if information is costless for the
lobby.
23 This argument can be made precise (see also Figure 1). A private test yields qx ∈ {0,q(x)}. The expected
outcome is q0. Thus, the relevant comparison is EΠL(qx = q0) Q EΠ
PR
L (x)=x(1−q0)EΠL(qx =0 )+( 1−x(1−
q0))EΠL(qx = q(x)). A public test diﬀers from the degenerate lottery only if the test is successful. Conditional
on success it yields qx ∈ {0,1} with expected outcome q(x). The comparison is EΠL(qx = q(x)) (or EΠL(PR) in






1−x(1−q0)EΠL(qx =1 ) . The reader familiar with Bennedsen
and Feldmann (2002) might have noticed that, although in their paper EΠL(q) is concave, sometimes information
is provided. The reason is again that the negative strategic eﬀect of informational lobbying is lowered by excluding
the searched district from the policy coalition. This increases the expected value of the private test, resulting









4S p e c i ﬁc Pressure Games and Induced Risk Proclivity
We analyze now two examples which provide micro-foundations for speciﬁc formulations of the
function EΠL(q) and support for the key ﬁndings laid out in the Introduction. We start by
showing how we can construct a reasonable lobbying game that is regular and, hence, whose
outcomes can be characterized using the results in the previous section.
4.1 A Regular Pressure Game: Lobbying as a Contest Game
Let us consider the implications of following the approach proposed by Tullock (1980) for rent-
seeking games, based on the idea that a higher level of eﬀort (pressure) — even if it increases the
chances of an agent of achieving his objective — never completely eliminates the uncertainty over
the ﬁnal outcome. This approach is particularly appealing to study political decisions as the
residual uncertainty over the ﬁnal decision may capture (in an analytically tractable way) other
factors inﬂuencing the decision that are not explicitly modelled. Hence, we follow Baye et al.
(1993) or Che and Gale (1998) by modelling the lobbying process as a contest and we assume




, and fB =1− fA.
In a world without lobby we interpret the support to be based exclusively on informational
grounds, that is, sA = q0 and sB =1 − q0, respectively. This implies that fA = q0 and
fB =1− q0.
The group can choose a level p of pressure at a constant marginal cost kp.I n l i n e w i t h
Tullock’s initial idea, pressure increases the support of policy B such that sB =1− q0 + p.24
The timing of this game is as before: First, the lobby may engage in informational lobbying
(with a public or a private test). When the lobby reveals the true state of the world, the
politician updates her belief. The group can then exert pressure. The objective function of the
lobby at the contribution stage is (we normalize the value of the prize for the lobby to 1):
EΠ(qx,k p,p)=
1 − qx + p
1+p
− kpp, (3)
where, as in the previous sections qx stands for the updated probability that the politician
assigns to state w = a after informational lobbying.
To ensure that we always have an interior solution to the pressure game, we assume that
t h ec o s to fp r e s s u r ei sr e l a t i v e l yl o w :kp ≤ q0. With this, it is easy to compute the optimal level
of pressure the lobby will exert in the pressure game and, from there, to compute the lobby’s
reduced payoﬀ f u n c t i o nf r o mt h ep r e s s u r eg a m e( EΠL(qx)): First, note that if qx =0 ,t h e n
24 This game is analyzed in detail in Dahm and Porteiro (2005), where a micro-foundation for the choice




















The key feature of this game is that, for every qx > 0, the lobby’s payoﬀ function is strictly
decreasing and convex in qx. From the analysis in Section 3 we know that this convexity induces
the lobby to have risk proclivity and, hence, we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 I ft h ep r e s s u r eg a m ei sm o d e l l e da sac o n t e s t ,t h a ti s ,EΠL is given by equation
(3)
(i) the lobby always uses informational lobbying (Proposition 2) and
(ii) the lobby always prefers to use a public test (Proposition 1).
In the next subsection we show that our main insights do not rely on the regularity of the
pressure game and how we can construct natural (but non-regular) pressure games in which the
main results are preserved.
4.2 A Simple Game: Information under the Shadow of Pressure
Suppose the politician obtains Rh if state and policy are matched correctly and Rl otherwise.
We normalize to Rh − Rl ≡ R ∈ (0,1] and suppose that q0 ∈ (1
2,1). Comparing the expected
payoﬀs EΠDM (A) and EΠDM (B) of the politician from both policies we obtain that she chooses
decision A, because
EΠDM (A) − EΠDM (B)=q0Rh +( 1− q0)Rl − q0Rl − (1 − q0)Rh
(5)
=( 2 q0 − 1)R ≡ ˜ p(q0,R) > 0.
The payoﬀs of the interest group L from each policy are given by ΠL(B)=VB and ΠL(A)=
VA,w i t hVB − VA ≡ 1 to maintain the normalization introduced in the previous subsection.
There is a conﬂict of interest and the lobby has incentives to inﬂuence the politician. To
allow the derivation of closed form solutions, we assume from now on that the cost function of
informational lobbying is C(x)=kix2,w h e r eki is a positive constant.
The lobby can also exert political pressure p ∈ R+ on the politician at a cost C(p)=kpp2,
where kp is a positive constant.25 We suppose that the politician compares her expected payoﬀ
premium, awarded by the electorate in the absence of any lobbying inﬂuence, from choosing
policy A to the pressure exerted. Formally, for any q0 and R, the politician chooses policy B if
a n do n l yi fp ≥ ˜ p(q0,R). If either the stakes R or the likelihood that the true state is a increase,
more pressure is required to induce policy B.26
25 We choose the quadratic cost function mainly to be consistent with the information game. Postulating linear
costs does not aﬀect the results qualitatively.









We use the notation p∗
M to indicate the optimal pressure level following message M.S i n c e
p∗
b =0 , we simplify notation and use p∗ to indicate p∗
M,M 6= b.T ow h i c ht e s tp∗
∅ refers will be
clear from the context.
Given any (posterior) belief qx > 0 the politician might hold in a pressure subgame, the
group exerts the threshold level p∗ =˜ p(qx,R) whenever this is proﬁtable, that is kp ≤ 1
˜ p(qx,R)2.
In this case the payoﬀsa r eEΠL(qx,R,p ∗)=VB − kp˜ p(qx,R)
2. For higher costs, p∗ =0and
EΠL(qx,R,p ∗)=VA.
This function EΠL(qx,R,p ∗) corresponds to EΠL(q) in the notation of the last section and
is drawn in Figure 2. If the cost of pressure kp are low, the pressure p∗ =˜ p(1,R)=R associated
with the highest possible belief is proﬁtable. In this case the strictly concave part ends in the
point (1,EΠL(1)) and the lower horizontal chord does not exist. However, as kp increases, for
high beliefs the necessary pressure level is no longer feasible. This creates the lower horizontal
chord, because for high beliefs EΠL(1) = VA is obtained. Therefore, as in the speciﬁc instance
drawn, an increase in the cost of pressure induces risk proclivity. We analyze now in detail the
incentives for voluntary information provision with each test and the induced preference over
tests.
4.2.2 A Private Test and Political Pressure
The negative strategic eﬀect that informational lobbying can have on the pressure game leads to
a posterior belief q(x) resulting in a new threshold ˜ p(q(x),R) which is increasing in the quantity
of information bought. Informational lobbying may raise the cost of political pressure needed
to induce the lobby’s favorite outcome. Deﬁne ˜ x ≡ min{
1−q0
2ki ,1}.
Proposition 3 Under a private test the lobby does not use political pressure and informational
lobbying together. There are two cases to be distinguished.
(i) For low kp only political pressure is exerted: x∗ =0and p∗ =˜ p(q0,R).
(ii) For high kp only informational lobbying is used: x∗ =˜ x and p∗ =0 .
The deﬁnition of the threshold is in the Appendix. Figure 2 conveys the intuition. For low
costs, the lower horizontal chord does not exist, risk aversion is induced and no informational
lobbying takes place. For suﬃciently high costs, the strictly concave part is ‘pushed to the left,’
risk proclivity is induced and information is provided. Both instruments are never combined
costly it is to exert pressure successfully. We suppose here for simplicity that when indiﬀerent DM chooses B.O u r
simple additive form of the eﬀect of political pressure has a relationship to the standard all-pay auction frequently
employed to model campaign contributions (see e.g. Baye et al (1993), Che and Gale (1998) or Matˇ ejka et al
(2002)). In an all-pay auction only the payments matter to the politician. This corresponds to the cases in which
R =0or q0 =
1
2. Our formulation is more realistic because the politician also wants to take the ‘right’ decision.
Moreover, such an incentive is needed for informational lobbying to play a role. As in virtually all models of








because p∗(q(x),R) > 0 requires EΠL(q(x)) >V A. In this case the strictly concave part is ‘not
pushed enough to the left’ to induce x∗ > 0 in the ﬁrst place.
4.2.3 A Public Test and Political Pressure
The negative strategic eﬀect that informational lobbying can have on the pressure game is
diﬀerent with a public test. The next result shows that this has consequences for the optimal
lobbying behavior.
Proposition 4 Under a public test three cases must be distinguished.
(i) For low kp only political pressure is exerted: x∗ =0and p∗ =˜ p(q0,R).
(ii) For intermediate kp informational lobbying is combined with political pressure whenever the
test fails: 0 <x ∗ < ˜ x, p∗
a =0and p∗
∅ =˜ p(q0,R).
(iii) For high kp only informational lobbying is used: x∗ =˜ x and p∗
a = p∗
∅ =0 .
The statement is rendered more precise in the Appendix. For ‘extreme’ costs of political
pressure — as with a private test — only one lobbying instrument is used. The intuition is the
same as for the private test. For intermediate costs, however, the option of a public test drives
a wedge between the two parameter spaces that are relevant with a private test.
Two remarks are in order here. First, it is not true that with one type of test there is always
a higher level of informational lobbying than with the other one. Consider the middle interval
deﬁned by the public test. The threshold for information provision with a private test lies in
this interval. This implies that we have ﬁrst x∗
PU >x ∗
PR and then the opposite. Second, the
fact that in the benchmark informational lobbying starts for lower kp with a public test than
with a private one seems to dependent on the functional form of EΠL(q).
Therefore, the implication we want to stress here is simply that given an attitude toward risk
(that is kp) both tests may create diﬀerent lobbying behaviors. The conditions of the information
game matter not only for informational lobbying but also for political pressure.
Combining Propositions 3 and 4, the following is immediate.
Corollary 3 The lobby always (weakly) prefers the public test to the private one. For interme-
diate values of kp this preference is strict.
Corollary 3 shows that the preference for credibility does not only hold for regular games to
which Corollary 1 can directly be applied. We show now that this preference also holds in two
straightforward extensions of this game implying that it is a more general feature of lobbying
games.
This simple game in which the lobby faces no uncertainty about the amount of pressure
needed to convince the politician can be generalized in two natural ways by introducing two dif-
ferent types of informational asymmetry about an important characteristic of the politician: (i)
Uncertainty over the information of the politician (the lobby is not certain about how convinced








the stakes of the politician (the lobby is uncertain about the exact value of R). Both extensions
are inspired by Wright (1996, p. 82) who argues that legislators are motivated (in part) by the
basic goals of reelection and successful policy: “The attainment of these goals is complicated by
the fact that legislators cannot be certain about how voters will react to their policy decisions,
[and] how policies will actually work once implemented...”. While we interpret uncertainty over
R as related to voter reactions, we believe that uncertainty over q0 captures uncertain adequacy
of policies.
The following corollaries show that the previous results are robust to each of these exten-
sions.27
Uncertainty over the Information of the Politician: Assume that while the politician
knows the exact value of q0, the lobby only knows that it is uniformly distributed on the line
segment [1
2,1].
Corollary 4 When the lobby is uncertain about the information of the politician
(i) the lobby always weakly prefers the public test (whenever kp > 1
2R2, this preference is strict);
(ii) with a public test the lobby combines always informational lobbying with political pressure.
Uncertainty over the Stakes of the Politician: Assume that the lobby does not know
t h ee x a c tv a l u eo fR and only knows that it is uniformly distributed on the line segment [0,1].
Corollary 5 When the lobby is uncertain about the stakes of the politician
(i) the lobby always weakly prefers the public test (whenever informational lobbying and political
pressure are combined this preference is strict);
(ii) with a public test the lobby combines informational lobbying with political pressure when-
ever pressure is a suﬃciently costly activity (formally, information and pressure are combined
whenever kp > ˜ V (q0) ≡
1−q0(2q0−1)2
4(1−q0)(2q0−1)2).
The eﬀect of the uncertainty is that exerting pressure becomes less reliable and, hence, less
proﬁtable as in the benchmark without uncertainty a s ,n o w ,t h e r em a yb ep o l i t i c i a n sw h or e s i s t
pressure. As the Corollaries highlight, this induces risk proclivity and, hence, favors the use of
information provision combined with pressure.
5 Is There Scope for a Private Test?
The analysis in the previous sections provides a strong case for credibility in information pro-
vision: whenever information and pressure are combined, the negative strategic eﬀect of infor-
mation provision on the proﬁtability of political pressure appears, and may be alleviated by a
commitment to provide credible information. The reader, at this stage, may wonder whether
this preference for credible information is global. In other words, is it possible to ﬁnd interesting
instances in which it is optimal for the lobby to selectively report information?
27 Detailed calculations for the following corollaries are available upon request (and for the convenience of the








In this section we address this issue by providing two alternative ways to rationalize the use
of a private test.
5.1 Irreversible Information Disclosure
One of the assumptions of the baseline model is that the function describing the payoﬀso ft h e
lobby (EΠL(q)) is decreasing and continuous in q. The continuity implies that, in terms of the
pressure game, there is only a marginal diﬀerence between facing a decision-maker that is almost
sure that he should not choose the lobby’s preferred policy (i.e., q =1− ε), and one that is
completely sure (i.e., q =1 ). Even if continuity is a natural assumption in many cases, there
might be situations in which it is not.
Consider the following setting: The decision-maker is the FDA evaluating whether to approve
or not a new drug that a given pharmaceutical ﬁrm (the lobby) wants to introduce in the market.
In this setting, it seems plausible to consider that if it becomes public information that the drug
should not be approved (i.e., w = a and, hence, q =1 ) the pharmaceutical ﬁrm has no capacity
at all to induce a positive approval by the FDA. However, if the information is not completely
conclusive (i.e., q ∈ (0,1)) the pharmaceutical ﬁrm retains some capacity (more limited as q
increases) to convince the FDA.28 This qualitative diﬀerence between ‘knowing’ and ‘being very
likely that’ generates a discontinuity in the lobby’s payoﬀs that can reverse the preference for a
public test we have obtained.
In order to sustain formally this argument, take the regular game presented in the previous
section and modify it slightly so that, when q =1(i.e., the decision-maker is certain that
the correct decision is A) pressure cannot be successful in convincing him to select policy B.





0 if q =1 .
We now analyze the implications that this discontinuity has for the incentives of the interest
group to engage in informational lobbying.
5.1.1 A Private Test
Note that, apart from the discontinuity, the game is exactly the one analyzed in Subsection
4.1. This implies that the interaction between the interest group and the decision-maker is only
altered in the speciﬁc event when the lobby reveals that w = a. If the lobby decides to use a
private test, this instance never occurs at equilibrium since when the lobby receives an outcome
of the test t = a, it always decides to not disclose this information and pretend the test failed
(i.e., M = ∅).
In a contest lobbying game with irreversible information, hence, the updated probability








the decision-maker assigns to state w = a is always such that qx < 1.29 The discontinuity is,
therefore, irrelevant when considering a private test. We simply apply the analysis in Subsection
4.1 to obtain the optimal lobbying behavior.
Corollary 6 I ft h ep r e s s u r eg a m ei sm o d e l l e da sac o n t e s t with irreversible information and the
lobby is endowed with a private test, he will always use informational lobbying combined with
pressure.
5.1.2 A Public Test
When the lobby is endowed with a public test, it will disclose the information that w = a with
probability xq0 and, hence, the fact that in this case the lobby loses any chance to achieve his
desired policy will alter the lobby’s incentives to do informational lobbying.
The lobby’s reduced payoﬀ function from the pressure game (EΠL(qx))i nt h i sc a s ei s :F i r s t ,
analogously as before, if qx =0 ,t h e nfB(0,k p,p)=1and therefore p∗(0,k p)=0and EΠL(qx =
0) = 1. The key change is that, if qx =1 , i.e., the lobby reveals that w = a, then it has no
chance to obtain decision B. Hence, p∗(qx =1 ,k p)=fB(qx =1 ,k p,p ∗)=EΠL(qx =1 )=0 .
Finally, if qx ∈ (0,1), we have that equations (4) apply.
Once the payoﬀ functions of the pressure game are computed, we can investigate the lobby’s
incentives to engage in informational lobbying. The lobby will choose the amount of information
(the value of x) in order to maximize equation (2) if he uses a public test and (1) if he uses a
private one. We compute the optimal level of information and ﬁnd the following.
Proposition 5 If the pressure game is modelled as a contest with irreversible information and
the lobby is endowed with a public test, he will never use informational lobbying combined with
pressure.
In this case, the price the lobby has to pay to reduce the informational externality (disclose
unwanted information) is so high that it never pays to engage in credible informational lobbying.
Combining this result with Corollary 6 it is immediate that.
Corollary 7 If the pressure game is modelled as a contest with irreversible information the
lobby always prefers to strategically withhold information (use a private test).
5.2 A Politician with Bargaining Power
Consider the simple game presented in Subsection 4.2 but suppose that when the pressure game
is reached the lobby cannot just exert political pressure at the exact amount of the reservation
value of the politician. Rather the politician can solicit a campaign contribution and doing so
29 With a private test there is only one case in which qx =1 , this would occur if the lobby decides to buy a
"perfect" test, i.e., x
∗ =1 . However, it is straightforward to check that, when information is irreversible, x
∗ =1








has some monopoly power.30 Assume that the precise amount is determined by negotiations
between the lobby and the legislator. We use the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where
α represents the lobby’s bargaining power:






The contribution is the higher, the larger the value of policy B for the lobby and the higher
the reservation value ˜ p(qx,R) of the politician. It decreases in its costs kp. The bargaining
power of the politician diminishes the payoﬀs EΠL(qx,R,p ∗)=α[VB −kp˜ p(qx,R)
2] of the lobby
proportionally.
Assume that the cost of pressure are so low that in the benchmark there is no informational
lobbying. Suppose ﬁrst the use of a public test.31 The next proposition is straightforward and
stated without proof.
Proposition 6 Let kp < 1
R2, assume that the lobby uses a public test and suppose that ki is







(1 − α)(1 − q0)VB + αkpR2((2q0 − 1)2 − q0)
¤o
.
This is positive if α is low or VB is high. In this case political pressure and informational lobbying
are employed together.
It is insightful to gain some intuition for this result. Giving bargaining power to the politician
changes the relative proﬁtability of both lobbying instruments and makes information provision
advantageous.32
T h en e x te x a m p l es h o w sh o ww ec a nﬁnd parameter conﬁgurations in which both considerable
informational lobbying might take place and the private test is the most proﬁtable option for
the lobby.
Example 3 Let q0 = 3
4, α = 1
5, VB =1and ki = 1
10. Over the parameter space kp ∈ [0, 1
R2],w e
have:
30 “If one party becomes extortionate ..., it is possible to elect another party which will provide the govern-
mental services [policy B] at a price more closely proportioned to costs of the party. If entry into politics is
eﬀectively controlled, we should expect one-party dominance to lead that party to solicit requests for protective
legislation but to extract a higher price for the legislation” Stigler (1971), p. 13.
31 The higher the costs, the less important is bargaining and the more the results resemble those of the
benchmark. The assumption that after successful informational lobbying no bargaining takes place is stronger
than needed and made for simplicity of the exposition. One could assume that the lobby’s bargaining power
depends on the test result and, thus, (negatively) on the posterior belief qx: 0 ≤ α(1) ≤ α(q0) ≤ α(0) ≤ 1.A s
long as α is not constant, the eﬀects presented here are present. From the expression for x
∗ (derived next) we
can see that a small diﬀerence in bargaining powers might generate already qualitatively very diﬀerent results,
provided the costs of pressure are low. If α is constant, a suﬃcient increase in the costs of political pressure makes
the provision of information advantageous.
32 The function EΠL(q) in Figure 2 is pushed downwards. When it lies below the chord connecting (0,EΠL(0))








• With a public test x∗ decreases linearly from x∗ =1to x∗ = 1
2.
• With a private test the ﬁrst order condition (derived from equation (1)) characterizes a
global maximizer and is given by (1 − α) − αkpR2(4q(x)2 − 1) = 4
5x. When kp → 0, we
have that x∗ → 1 and if kp → 1
R2 then x∗ → 0.5107.
• When kp → 1
R2 the lobby’s optimal choice is to combine information with pressure and to
use a private test.I np a r t i c u l a r :
— With a private test, if kp → 1
R2 then x∗ → 0.5107 and proﬁts are EΠPR
L (x∗ =
0.5107) = 0.186.
— Exclusive pressure obtains EΠP
L(p∗)=0 .15.
— Using only informational lobbying gives EΠI
L(x∗ =1 )=0 .156 independent of kp.
— W i t hap u b l i ct e s tw eh a v et h a ti fkp → 1
R2 then x∗ → 0.5 and proﬁts are EΠPU
L (x∗ =
0.5) = 0.175.
This example has several implications:
• With both tests informational lobbying and political pressure might be combined for very
low costs of the latter.
• The optimal political pressure and information level might be diﬀerent depending on the
test.
• The lobby might prefer the private test and provide information voluntarily.
This last insight is the one we want to highlight as it contradicts the main tendency found
in the paper towards providing credible information. What is key to induce this preference
reversal? Endowing the politician with some bargaining power crucially changes the interac-
tion between the informational activity and the pressure game. In the standard game without
bargaining, informational lobbying imposed a negative externality over the pressure game and
the preference for credibility emerged as the optimal way to alleviate this externality. When we
embed a bargaining process in the pressure stage, this game depends less on the outcome of the
information provision game and more on the relative strength of each part in the negotiation.
The impact of the negative externality on the pressure game, hence, is weaker. As a result, the
lobby can exploit the advantage of selectively reporting information without imposing a severe
damage over his position in the pressure stage.33
This subsection shows, therefore, that if the interaction between the lobby and the politician
in the pressure game is conditioned by aspects diﬀerent from the information provision, then we
can expect the lobby to fully exploit his strategic capabilities when engaging in informational
lobbying.
33 Notice that example 2 provides another inst a n c ei nw h i c ht h en e g a t i v es t r a t e g i ce ﬀect of informational








6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have presented a model in which an interest group can strategically provide veriﬁable policy-
relevant information and exert political pressure. Our analysis contributes toward an integration
of two largely separated literatures analyzing each lobbying instrument in isolation. By doing so
our model allows to explain the stylized fact that lobbies engage both in information provision
and political pressure. Our approach predicts when a lobby prefers to provide information
credibly and when he prefers to retain scope to withhold information. However, we identify a
strong tendency toward credibility.
Our ﬁndings have important policy implications. For instance, concerning the motivating
FDA regulation example, we can say that, since pharmaceutical companies must be required to
provide information, we should expect them to have an incentive not to register their clinical
trials and to report results selectively. Moreover, the analysis performed in Subsection 5.1
shows that, in the particular case of the pharmaceutical ﬁrms there can be eﬀects that induce
them to strategically withhold information. Our work lends therefore support for the eﬀorts
of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) and the World Health
Organization (WHO) as well as the proposed Fair Access to Clinical Trials (FACT) Act in
the U.S. which aim at promoting registration of all clinical trials. The industry position that
endorses voluntary disclosure of information about clinical drug trials but does not include a legal
requirement for disclosure does not seem to be suﬃcient.34 Further policy implications of our
analysis concerning campaign ﬁnance regulation are explored in Dahm and Porteiro (2005). In
this concluding section we discuss now some of our simplifying assumptions and future research.
Supposing veriﬁable reports has helped us to make a clear connection between informational
lobbying and lotteries over uncertain outcomes. Alternatively, informational lobbying has been
modelled without this assumption (see e.g. Austen-Smith and Wright (1992)). Still, in such
a setting the result of informational lobbying is uncertain and depends, for instance, on the
legislators checking strategy.
The assumption of the availability of a commitment device not to hold back information
allowed us to identify a ‘rationale for credibility’ that does not rely on reputation eﬀects in a
repeated game framework. The concern of lobbies to be credible — stressed in the descriptive
literature on lobbying — is rationalized entirely by the lobby’s aim to limit the negative strategic
eﬀect of informational lobbying on the continuation game.35 Although both tests postulated are
extreme benchmark cases, they capture realistically that a lobby has some freedom to choose his
degrees of credibility when transmitting information. Suppose there is a continuum of experts
characterized by a probability z ∈ [z,z] ⊆ [0,1] determining whether the lobby will be able to
34 See EFPIA (2005).
35 Note also that the negative strategic eﬀect arises because the politician is assumed to observe the lobby’s
investment in information. This assumption is also made in models without veriﬁability (see e.g. Austen-Smith
and Wright (1992)). In a model with veriﬁable information, Bennedsen and Feldmann (2005) show that if the
politician is rational and forms optimal expectations about the incentives of the lobby to acquire information, she








hold back information. We can think of z as a linear combination between a public and a private
test. Our analysis implies that the lobby always prefers to be as credible as possible (z)o rt o
maximize the scope for manipulation (z) depending on his attitude toward risk.
Another important assumption is that there is only one lobby. Although there are many
political decisions in which the advocates of one side of an issue are not organized and can
therefore not coordinate on an eﬀective lobbying strategy, situations in which competitive lob-
bying takes place are clearly relevant.36 However, the results in Section 3 do not depend on a
precise formulation of the pressure game and there could be competitive political pressures.
With multiple information providers other strategic eﬀects may come into play.37 Is it
possible that one lobby ‘specializes’ in information provision, while the other ‘specializes’ in
exerting political pressure? Our analysis invites the conjecture that such a situation could be
generated by diﬀerent stakes. For one lobby stakes are high, pressure is proﬁtable, risk aversion
is induced and no informational is provided. For the other group stakes are low, pressure is not
feasible and risk proclivity results in informational lobbying.
A more careful analysis could build upon an analogy to Bulow et al (1985). From their
analysis concerning oligopoly markets one conjectures that the result of competitive lobbying
depends on (1) joint economies or diseconomies among the lobbying instruments of one lobby
and on (2) whether lobbies’ regard their, say informational activity, as a strategic substitute
or complement to the informational activity of other lobbies. Joint economies (diseconomies)
have a close relationship to complementary (substitutive) lobbying instruments. The attentive
reader might have realized that in the present paper the relationship between both lobbying
instruments can both be substitutive and complementary. This suggests that there may be
both joint economies or diseconomies.38 But this falls short from determining the overall eﬀect.
Further research on the strategic interaction of lobbying instruments and the eﬀect of regulation
should be fruitful.
Examples 1 and 2 suggest that the basic forces we have identiﬁed are also active in other
situations of information transmission where political pressure is not available. Although, these
situations require to be modelled carefully, our analysis suggests that these situations can be
understood in a similar vain: the institutions of information transmission as lotteries and the
continuation game as determining the attitude toward risk.
36 But note that e.g. Schlozman and Tierney (1986, p. 213) report a number of works ﬁnding that in a
majority of cases and studies only lobbies on one side of an issue were active. Also, for the interpretation of
i s s u ea ds p e n d i n ga sp o l i t i c a lp r e s s u r e ,T h eA n n e n b e r gP u b l i cP o l i c yC e n t e r( 2 0 0 5 )r e p o r t st h a tt h i ss p e n d i n gi s
usually very uneven so that one side of an issue dominates the public policy debate.
37 Bennedsen and Feldmann (2005) have shown that competition among information providers has the inter-
esting eﬀect to reduce the incentives for information provision when political pressure is available.
38 A basic intuition of the concept of joint economies is that an improvement in the ‘conditions of one market’,
that is, a decrease in the cost of pressure, goes hand in hand with an improvement of the conditions in the other
market. This should lead to an increase in the optimal investment in information. On the other hand, by a
similar reasoning, an increase in the cost of pressure leads to a reduction in the level of information provided.
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AA p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From equations (1) and (2), ∀x ∈ (0,1) EΠPU
L (x) ≤ EΠPR
L (x) i fa n do n l yi f
xq0EΠL(qx =1 )+( 1− x)EΠL(qx = q0) ≤ (1 − x(1 − q0))EΠL (qx = q(x)).
Deﬁne the LHS as EΠPU
L (x|t 6= b) a n dt h eR H Sa sEΠPR
L (x|t 6= b).C o n s i d e r ﬁrst the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The function EΠPR
L (x|t 6= b) is such that:
∂2EΠPR















P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Follows from straightforward computation of the ﬁrst two derivatives of
EΠPR
L (x|t 6= b).
This lemma establishes a one to one correspondence between the curvature of EΠPR
L (x|t 6= b)
with respect to x and that of EΠL with respect to q. Since (1 − q0)q(x)
∂q(x)
∂x > 0, if follows
that the function EΠPR
L (x|t 6= b) is convex (concave/ linear) in x, if and only if EΠL is convex
(concave/ linear) in q. Given that EΠPU
L (x|t 6= b) is a linear function in x and EΠPU
L (x|t 6= b)=
EΠPU
L (x|t 6= b) for x ∈ {0,1}, parts (i), (ii) and (iii) follow. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2




=( 1− q0)EΠL (qx =0 )+q0EΠL (qx =1 )− EΠL (qx = q0) − C0 (x) ≡ 0.
Given C00 (x) > 0, the second order condition for a maximizer is fulﬁlled. The amount of
information bought x∗ is strictly positive if and only if
(1 − q0)EΠL (q =0 )+q0EΠL (q =1 )>E ΠL (q = q0).
Since q0 =( 1− q0)0+q01, this requirement is fulﬁlled if the function EΠL (q) is strictly convex
in q.I fEΠL (q) is concave in q,t h e nx∗ =0 .
Suppose a private test. Computing the ﬁrst derivative of equation (1) yields
(1 − q0)
µ
EΠL (qx =0 )+
∂EΠL (qx = q(x))
∂q
q(x) − EΠL (qx = q(x))
¶
− C0(x).
Assume EΠL (q) is strictly convex in q and that x∗ =0 . Optimality requires that at x∗ =0the
previous derivative is non-positive, or equivalently
EΠL (qx =0 )≤ EΠL (qx = q0) −
∂EΠL (qx = q0)
∂q
q0.
This contradicts the convexity of EΠL (q) in q.39 Assume now that EΠL (q) is concave in q.
Since the second order condition is given by the expression in Lemma 1 minus C00(x), it is strictly
concave and the ﬁrst order condition determines a global maximizer. A necessary condition for
x∗ > 0 is that, there exists an x such that
EΠL (qx =0 )− EΠL (qx = q(x)) +
∂EΠL (qx = q(x))
∂q
q(x) > 0.
Since EΠL (q) is concave for all q,s u c hx does not exist. Q.E.D.
39 EΠL (q) is strictly convex in q, if for every q
0, q
00 it is true that EΠL (q
















A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To render the statement more precise, the threshold postulated in the proposition is 1
˜ p(q0,R)2(1−
(1−q0)2
4ki ) if x∗ < 1 and 1
˜ p(q0,R)2(q0 + ki) otherwise.
We show ﬁrst that the lobby never uses both instruments. Suppose it does and ˜ p(q(x),R) is
proﬁtable (or kp ≤ 1
(2q(x)−1)2R2). Denote this activity by IP. Using equation (1) and denoting
the choice of exclusive pressure without informational lobbying by P yields γ(x)=EΠP
L −
EΠIP
L (x) ≥ 0
⇔− kp(2q0 − 1)2R2 +( 1− x(1 − q0))kp(2q(x) − 1)2R2 + kix2 ≥ 0.
At x =0 , γ(x)=0(since EΠIP




=( 1− q0)kpR2(2q(x) − 1)(2q(x)+1 )+2 kix>0,∀x.
Therefore, for a given level of informational lobbying x, the lobby either prefers P to IP or
IP i sn o tf e a s i b l ea n dt h ec h o i c em u s tb em a d eb e t w e e nP and informational lobbying I only.
Thus, it remains to proof that I is preferred to P if and only if the condition of the Proposition
is fulﬁlled. We have,
EΠP
L ≥ EΠI
L(x)=x(1 − q0)VB +( 1− x(1 − q0))VA − kix2
⇔ (1 − x(1 − q0)) ≥ kp˜ p(q0,R)2 − kix2 ⇔ 1+kix2 ≥ kp˜ p(q0,R)2 + x(1 − q0).
The unique maximizer for EΠI
L(x) is x∗ =˜ x as described. We have then that EΠP
L ≥
EΠI
L(x∗) is determined by the threshold given above. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
To render the statement more precise:
• The two thresholds postulated in the proposition are
q0
˜ p(q0,R)2 and 1
˜ p(q0,R)2.




ki[kp˜ p(q0,R)2 − q0],1}.
Consider the expected proﬁts of combining pressure and information (again denoted by IP)
and given by equation (2). Note that for x =0 ,EΠIP
L (x)=EΠP
L while for p =0 ,EΠIP
L (x)=
EΠI
L. The latter happens for 1
(2q0−1)2R2 ≤ kp (no pressure game is aﬀordable). For this case x∗
has been determined in Proposition 3. For lower costs the derivative of EΠIP
L (x) w.r.t. x is
q0 max{VA,V B − kpR2} +( 1− q0)VB − (VB − kp(2q0 − 1)2R2) − 2kix.
Suppose kp ≤ 1
R2 (both pressure games are aﬀordable). The ﬁrst order condition is negative and








It remains to consider 1
R2 <k p < 1
(2q0−1)2R2 (only the cheaper pressure game is aﬀordable).
















(2q0−1)2R2 and, again, if x∗ =0 ,t h e np∗ =˜ p(q0,R). It remains to
check that IP is preferred to I.W eo b t a i nEΠIP
L (x)−EΠI
L(x)=( 1−x)(1−kp(2q0 −1)2R2) >
0,∀x. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The objective function that the lobby maximizes is given in (2). Substituting the equilibrium
proﬁts in the pressure stage: EΠL(qx =0 )=1 , EΠL(qx =1 )=0and EΠL(q0)=1−2
p
q0kp +
kp,w eh a v e :
EΠPU







Maximizing this function, and taking into account that C0 (0) = 0, we have that there is infor-
mation provision (i.e., x∗ > 0)i fa n do n l yi f
















and this never holds. Q.E.D.
B Appendix: Not Intended For Publication
This Appendix is for the convenience of the referees only.
B.1 Further Details for Example 2
We start with a table showing the equivalence of notation in Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002)
— BF02 in what follows — and the main body of the paper:
BF02 notation q r r bi p0 uL
our notation x 0 1 0 1 − q0 EΠL(q)
The fact that a legislator maximizes ui = rigi − 1
6G2 follows from n =3and substitution in
the ﬁrst equation on p. 924 of BF02. Our requirement that the group searches in exactly one
district translates to s =1in BF02. Therefore, the lobby maximizes uL = G∗(q) —w h a t e v e r
the cost of informational lobbying. This is given by equation (2) in BF02 which simpliﬁes in our
example. Deﬁne B = 1
1−q0. We treat this in what follows as a constant because it corresponds








1. The lobby searches in the agenda setter’s district (with probability 1
3). If the search reveals
that the agenda setter’s marginal valuation is ra =0he proposes G∗ =0 .I n a l l o t h e r
cases he proposes G∗ = 3
1
1−qx +B,w i t hqx ∈ {0,q 0,q(x)} depending on the test type and
result.
2. The lobby does not search in the agenda setter’s district (with probability 2
3)a n dt h e
search reveals high marginal valuation ri =1(with probability x(1−q0)). Here G∗ = 3
1+B
(which happens with total frequency
2x(1−q0)
3 ).
3. The lobby does not search in the agenda setter’s district and the search fails or reveals low
marginal valuation ri =0(which happens with total frequency
2(1−x(1−q0))
3 ). Independent



















(1 − x(1 − q0))
3
2B










xq0 ∗ 0+( 1− x))
3
2B







(1 − x(1 − q0))
3
2B













(1 − x(1 − q0))
+
(1 − x)




















B.2 For Corollary 4: when the type of politician is uncertain.
We ﬁrst need to analyze the optimal level of political pressure given the result of informational
lobbying. Suppose a public test has been used and state a has been revealed. Analogously to the
benchmark, p∗
a ∈ {0,R} because it is clear that the politician has the highest possible posterior.
When the public test fails, the lobby’s problem is more involved. Solving equation (5) for q0





2 such that the politician chooses
policy B i fa n do n l yi fq0 ≤ ˜ q(p,R). Any given level of pressure p convinces the politician to
choose alternative B for any level of q0 smaller than the threshold level ˜ q(p,R);i . e .o n l yi ft h e
politician is relatively unsure that the correct choice is A.I f p =0 ,t h e n˜ q(p,R)=1
2.T h e























It is straightforward to solve this problem. For any R,w eh a v et h a tp∗
∅ = R if kp ≤ 1
2R2 and
1
2Rkp otherwise. In the former case EΠL(R,p∗




The next Lemma indicates the choice of p∗ depending on the result of the public test. We
a l s ou s eL e m m a2t od e ﬁne three regions of the parameter space that we will refer to in the
remainder of the proof.
Lemma 2 Consider a public test.
(i) Region 1: For kp ≤ 1
2R2, we have that p∗
a = p∗
∅ = R.
(ii) Region 2: For 1
2R2 <k p < 1




(iii) Region 3: For 1




Consider now a private test. The negative strategic eﬀect adjusts ˜ q(p,R) to
˜ q(p,R,x) ≡
(p + R)(1 − x)




∂x ≤ 0, the higher the quality of the test, the lower the threshold value ˜ q(p,R,x).
For a given level of pressure politicians with a relatively high prior probability q0 are no longer
induced to choose as the lobby wishes — although for x =0the pressure level was suﬃcient.
Deﬁne γ(x)=EΠPR
L (x) − EΠPU
L (x).N o t e t h a t i f x =0 ,t h e nγ(0) = 0.W e a n a l y z e t h e
three regions separately.
(i) Region 1: By Lemma 2 p∗
a = p∗
∅ = R for a public test. For a private test p∗
∅ = R,t o o .
(The ﬁrst derivative of the analogous maximization program to equation (6) using ˜ q(p,R,x) is
positive at p =0and p = R and it is either convex for low cost and then concave or concave
everywhere). Thus, γ(x)=0 .
(iii) Region 3: By Lemma 2 p∗







EΠL(qx = q(x)) − E(q0)xVA − (1 − x)EΠL(R,p∗
∅).
Note that for x =1the updated probability the politician assigns to state a is equal to
one. But in region 3, p∗
a =0and hence, if x is suﬃciently large, exerting pressure is not
proﬁtable. Formally, there exists x such that for all x ≥ x, EΠL(qx = q(x)) = VA. For all
x ≥ x, γ(x)=−(1−x)(EΠL(R,p∗
∅)−VA) ≤ 0, with equality for x =1and γ0(x) > 0 (using the








































(p + R)(R − p)




Since p∗ is decreasing in R,i ts u ﬃces to check if this inequality holds for the lowest value of
R compatible with being in Region 3. The boundary of this region is given by the condition kp =
1
R2. Therefore, the lowest value of R is R = 1 √
kp




. It is straightforward
to check that for these values (and, hence, for the whole region 3), γ0(x)|x=0 ≤ 0.

















Straightforward calculations show that γ(x) is concave.
(ii) Region 2: It suﬃces to observe that here γ(x) is smaller than in region 3, since pa = R,
implying that the term −E(q0)xVA is substituted with −E(q0)x[VB−kpR2] and VB−kpR2 ≥ VA.
Therefore, we have shown that (i) As long as kp > 1
2R2 the lobby strictly prefers a public
test rather than a private one
We now show that the lobby will actually combine information and pressure:
Maximization of (2) yields the optimal level of information




















kpR2 > 0 which
is increasing in kp.
(ii) In region 2, by Lemma 2 p∗
∅ <Rand p∗
a = R. Thus, (at an interior optimum) x∗ =
1




∅ }, which is positive if and only if, 1
kp ≥ E(q0)R2 + p∗2
∅ .
In this region we have that 1
kp ≥ R2 implying that it suﬃces to show that R2(1 − E(q0)) ≥ p∗2
∅

















which is increasing in kp and positive.
We have shown, therefore, that with a public test the lobby will always combine information
provision with pressure. Q.E.D.
B.3 For Corollary 5: When the stakes of the politician are uncertain.
Assume that the politician knows the precise value of R, while the lobby only knows that R
is uniformly distributed on the line segment [0,1]. This implies that the lobby does not know
exactly how much pressure is necessary in order to induce his preferred policy B.H o w e v e r ,h e








choose alternative B if R is low enough. More formally, there exists a threshold ˜ R(p,qx) ≡
p
2qx−1
such that the politician chooses policy B if and only if R ≤ ˜ R(p,qx).I fp =0 ,t h e n ˜ R(p,qx)=0
and policy A is almost always be chosen. If p =2 qx − 1,t h e n ˜ R(p,qx)=1and the politician
chooses B whatever R.40 The problem of the interest group is
max













Analyzing the ﬁrst and second order conditions leads to the following lemma.











EΠL(qx,p ∗) is concave or convex depending on whether the cost of pressure and the (poste-
rior) belief qx are high enough.
Lemma 4 Consider a public test.
(i) For kp ≤ 1
2, we have that p∗
a =1 ,p ∗
∅ =2 q0 − 1.
(ii) For 1
2 <k p < 1
2(2q0−1)2, we have that p∗
a < 1,p ∗
∅ =2 q0 − 1.
(iii) For 1
2(2q0−1)2 ≤ kp, we have that p∗
a < 1,p ∗
∅ < 2q0 − 1.
Once we have these auxiliary results, we can prove that whenever both instruments are used,
a public test is preferred.
Proof: We study the three intervals, deﬁned in Lemma 4 separately.
(i) Suppose kp ≤ 1
2. We compute the optimal amount of information bought with both






, the program can be rewritten as maxx VB −kp
(2q0−1+x(1−q0))2
1−x(1−q0) −kix2. Since
this is a strictly decreasing function of x, x∗ =0 . Analogously, for a public test, the lobby
maximizes equation (2). Computing the ﬁrst order condition and substituting EΠL(qx =1 )=
VB − kp and EΠL(qx = q0)=VB − kp (2q0 − 1)
2,a l l o w st oc h e c kt h a t
∂EΠPU
L (x)
∂x < 0, ∀x.
Therefore, x∗ =0and the lobby is (trivially) indiﬀerent both tests.
(iii) Suppose kp ≥ 1
2(2q0−1)2.D e ﬁne γ (x)=EΠPR
L (x) − EΠPU
L (x).W eh a v e
γ (x)=−(1 − x)(EΠL(qx = q0) − EΠL(qx = q(x)))
+xq0 (EΠL(qx = q(x)) − EΠL(qx =1 ) ).
40 Note that,
∂ ˜ R(p,qx)





















(2q0 − 1+x(1 − q0))
2
1 − x(1 − q0)
and





2(2q0 − 1+x(1 − q0))
1 − x(1 − q0)
+
(2q0 − 1+x(1 − q0))
2




Because γ00 (x) > 0, γ (x) is a convex function. Moreover, γ (0) = γ (1) = 0 ensures that
γ (x) ≤ 0, for every value of x. The public test is preferred.






. First, for a private test, there exists a threshold ¯ x, such
that if x>¯ x, then the optimal pressure level when the test does not reveal t = b is interior.
For these values of x the reasoning of part (iii) applies. If x ≤ ¯ x the problem is as in part
(i) and, therefore, x =0 . For a public test, the lobby maximizes the same function as in part
(i) but now in the ﬁrst order condition EΠL(qx =1 )=VA + 1
4kp must be used. We obtain






> 0. R e a r r a n g i n gt e r m s ,w eh a v et h a tx>0 if kp is











q0 (1 − q0)(4q0 − 1)
´
, which is always higher than kp = 1
2(2q0−1)2. Again,
the public test is equivalent to the private one. Q.E.D.
Now that we know that the lobby prefers the public test, we will check when this instrument
is used simultaneously with pressure.
Lemma 5 There exists a critical value ˜ V (q0) ≡
1−q0(2q0−1)2
4(1−q0)(2q0−1)2 such that the lobby invests in a
public test if and only if kp > ˜ V (q0).M o r e o v e r ,w h e nM 6= {b}, a positive amount of political
pressure is exerted.
Proof: We have already shown that for kp ≤ 1
2(2q0−1)2 no information is bought. We analyze
now the remaining interval. Computing the ﬁrst order condition of the problem maxx EΠPU
L (x)
and substituting EΠL(qx =1 )=VA + 1
4kp and EΠL(qx = q0)=VA + 1
4kp(2q0−1)2, allows to






> 0 ⇔ kp > ˜ V (q0). It remains to verify that
1−q0(2q0−1)2
4(1−q0)(2q0−1)2 > 1
2(2q0−1)2, which is true. Q.E.D.
32